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Karl Wolff
NAME- Karl Wolff
DATE (S) OF INTERVIEWS (S)- Dec. 1983, Jan. 1984
LOCATION (S) OF INTERVIEW (S)- Munich, West Germany
LANGUAGE (S) CONDUCTED- English/German
SIGNIFICANCE OF SUBJECT- -Adjutant to Reichsfuehrer-SS Heinrich Himmler, 1942-44 -Chief of SS Personnel Office, 1943- 44, Expert on Eastern Affairs -Commander of Order Police, Italian Front, 1945. -Anti-Partisan Organization for the SS. SS Lieutenant General,
OTHERS IN ATTENDANCE- Waffen SS Major Rudolf von Falkenhahn (Dec. 1993 only).
FORMAT Q & A standard
Q- Please provide some background about yourself, General.
A- I was born in 1900, so I am now almost eighty-four years old.
Q- What was your education like?
A- I had the typical German education, and passed the abitur in 1918
when the First World War was almost over.
Q- When did you join the NSDAP?
A- I joined in the 1920’s, so I am one of the original members. This was when I met Himmler, Hess, and later Hitler. The early days of the Party.
Q- Did you join as a soldier?
A- No, I was a policeman originally, and Goering was my boss, before Himmler took over the Gestapo and SS, and all police functions fell under the Order Police, SD or Gestapo, depending upon their various duties.
Q- How did you become involved with anti-partisan policy?
A- The problem first became evident in 1941 in Russia. During the war between eight and twelve percent of all materiel losses were because of partisan action, with most occurring in Yugoslavia and Russia. The field commanders decided that something had to be done on a large military scale. The Reichs-fuehrer was concerned with the problems of partisans, especially in Russia and Yugoslavia, where they were virtually unchecked. Our Hungarian, Romanian, and Bulgarian allies were also experiencing problems with partisans, and this was what Himmler said to me; ‘Wolff, do you believe that we may be successful in trying to create our own units of partisans to work behind enemy lines? Perhaps they could work with the SS commando units, if we approach this problem correctly it may work.’ I spoke to Felix Steiner and later Otto Kumm about this, and they were of the opinion that it would work. The greatest problem was trying to undo the damage already done from the invasion [of Russia] forward with regard to the civilian populations, especially the mass executions, which had not been handled very well.
Q- How did the counterinsurgency policy develop?
A- Not easily, due to many problems. Hitler had received combat reports that showed a rise in partisan activity that was impeding progress during the invasion. Later this would become a terrible problem in rear areas, and Hitler wanted it halted at all costs. The policy originated in the field, but eventually our office established policy and issued orders, which were not always obeyed, and I think this was rightly so. The commander in the field was more aware of the situation than staff officers in Berlin. The problem had become so critical, especially where morale among the troops was concerned that Steiner, Bach-Zelewski and I decided that, with the proper analysis and experienced officers on the project we could arrive at some solution. Several plans had been tried previously, such as propaganda broadcasts and dropping leaflets by aircraft and artillery shells dropped into suspected partisan areas. This was mostly a waste of time, since the partisans fighting us were not really worth trying to convert. We needed to enlist the loyalty of those who had yet been pressed into partisan or Soviet military service. Failing that, the second plan was to develop tactics for soldiers in the field, offering better chances of success while raising their morale, which by 1943 was not as high as we would have liked to think, at least in Russia. We had to establish an understanding as to how important the partisan struggle was in order to stem the potential for any psychological problems or questions of morality. What we derived was placed into service, and ‘Florian Geyer’, ‘Maria Theresia’ and other units were specially trained in these tactics. They worked far beyond our expectations, offering Hitler the chance to strike a new combat award, the Anti-Partisan Badge in three grades; bronze, silver and gold for fifty, seventy-five and 100 days of such combat. The men who won these awards were few and they wore them proudly. It was not unusual to have men in an anti-partisan unit all decorated with the Iron Cross in either of the two classes, and even higher decorations.
Q- How did the intelligence services work with your office?
A- There were of course problems; different branches competing for money and resources, and there was not always the trust and comradeship between the services. I suppose this was true of all militaries in all countries.
Q- Did you ever meet Reinhard Gehlen?
A- Yes, many times. He was an amazingly intelligent person, although he did not hide his dislike of the SS, even the Waffen SS, and Himmler hated him, and Hitler secretly envied him, I believe. However, Gehlen was not one to hold his opinion and he never changed his reports, regardless of how unpopular they may have been, so you must respect him for that. Jodl wanted to have him shot, along with Keitel, because after every meeting with Hitler the Fuehrer would be in a bad mood, and they would receive the brunt of it. Hitler would say to them, ‘Gehlen saw this or that, why did you not see this as well?’ Hitler would accuse them of incompetence when Gehlen’s figures of production in Russia or the estimates of Soviet reinforcements proved to be accurate. However, once Gehlen came into the meeting with the Fuehrer in the Chancellery, and after informing Hitler that, despite seventeen months of fighting since the start of (Operation) Barbarossa, and the six or seven million killed or captured Soviets, we could expect a resurgence in the spring. He was especially frightening with his estimates of future partisans we could expect to encounter. Hitler threatened to have him placed in a sanitarium if he ever spouted such nonsense again, and threw him out. This was November 1942 I believe, and General of Fighters [Adolf Galland, [Rudolf von] Falkenhahn, and [Hans] Baur were there, along with Goering, Himmler and several others whom I cannot remember. It has been a long time. Gehlen always told the truth as he saw it and infuriated Hitler on several occasions, such as his denouncing key individuals and calling certain gauleiters incompetent, blaming much of the problem on them.
Q- Who in particular comes to mind?
A- Erich Koch was a Hitler favourite and Gehlen disliked him intensely. Gehlen believed that people like Koch would only create greater problems with the populations, increasing partisan resistance. All of Gehlen’s concerns were disregarded by Hitler, Himmler, and the High Command.
Q- Did Gehlen become active the anti-partisan war?
A- Yes, very much so. He became Director of Foreign Armies East later, and was involved in the Freiwilligen (volunteer) recruitment in Russia, and eventually more than a million former Red Army soldiers and civilians served in the German ranks directly or in separate units, such as Vlasov’s Army. However, Hitler was not informed of this until August 1944, if I remember correctly. He (Gehlen) was opposed to the Einsatzgruppen methods, and also was not supportive of political officers being assigned to front line units. They were not trusted due to their connections to the SD and Gestapo, where their reports on morale and other concerns were sent.
Q- How well did the SS counterinsurgency units work with the Army units?
A- Sometimes it worked well, and sometimes it did not. This was to be expected. However, there were some commanders who did not want to be part of any SS operations.
Q- Do any officers come to mind?
A- Well, perhaps the most outspoken critic was [Hasso von] Manteuffel. He absolutely hated the SS, with exception to the Waffen SS, and there was a difference, you understand? Nearly all of the Army commanders wanted their own Waffen SS units attached due to their fighting skill. Manteuffel’s position on working with the SS became well known.
Q- What was the problem?
A- Manteuffel had apparently issued orders that anyone from the SD or Einsatz-gruppen would be tried and shot if they attempted to take men from his command without his written authorisation, which would never be given for anti-partisan missions. He felt that his men could perform their own partisan roundups without SS assistance. I do not remember exactly how this infor-mation came to be known by the Reichsfuehrer, although I can tell you that I had never seen him so upset about anything personally. Once Manteuffel’s statement had been confirmed I was ordered to draft a letter the general, asking him to clarify his position on this matter. Within two weeks von Manteuffel had responded, and his blunt method of dealing with our office only made the problem worse. Himmler finally had a meeting with Hitler, and most of us on the General Staff were present except Goering. Himmler wanted to know what should be done about Manteuffel and his disregard for the field orders. Hitler simply stated, ‘I would not concern myself with Baron Manteuffel. He seems to have his house in order.’ I don’t believe that Himmler found this to be a satisfactory answer, and he never forgave Manteuffel for threatening his field commanders.
Q- Were their any SS generals who disagreed with Himmler or his policies?
A- Yes, and I can tell you personally that there were several high ranking SS officers who did not agree with Himmler, and most apparently did not like him for various reasons.
Q- Which policies seemed to give these men the most trouble, and who were they?
A- The list is quite long, such as [Wilhelm] Bittrich, [Paul] Hausser, Bach-Zelewski, [Josef ‘Sepp’] Dietrich, Steiner, [Herbert] Gille, [Friedrich-Wilhelm] Krueger, and others. Himmler did have his supporters, such as [Theodor] Eicke, [Hans] Mueller and others. This dissent became known, although very quietly, you understand, during a meeting in Russia. This was in late 1941, September possibly, I do not remember exactly although I was also present. Himmler ordered the meeting with the high-ranking field commanders and several administrative officers. His purpose was to inform the group of what the Fuehrer’s official policies were, how we were to conduct the war in the east, and how to officially handle the local populations. The Aryan peoples were to be brought into the German Reich, the Volksgemeinschaft, while others were to be excluded. Himmler never at any time openly stated killing civilians. However, he did use expressions such as ‘permanent removal’, ‘relocation,’ and ‘racial purification’. Himmler explained the genetic superiority of Aryans, and cautioned the officers regarding the mixing of the races among their men, and that they held the responsibility of maintaining the laws. I remember afterward that Wilhelm Bittrich, who was a highly respected officer, stated during the luncheon that ‘The things Heinrich says are sheer nonsense! Things will go badly for us if we don’t change our ways, and he is a fool if he does not understand this.’ At least fifteen high ranking SS colonels and generals heard this, including myself, although I did not display any outward sign that I had heard, let alone would choose sides. Himmler was my boss, after all.
Q- You met all of the great commanders at one time or another, as I understand. What were your personal opinions of some of the more controversial officers?
A- Well, of the SS I knew all of them, and perhaps the most controversial was Erich von dem Bach-Zelewski. He believed that Hitler was Germany’s only hope to alter the misfortunes of the past. However, given that, he openly disagreed with Himmler on policy. Along with Bittrich they routinely had their men removed from areas that might be considered suspicious regarding partisan activity, such as peaceful villages. However, Zelewski could be very ruthless and efficient when actually engaged with partisans, and as the first official commander of the anti-partisan commandos this was where he earned his Knight’s Cross. The doctrine would be refined later, but this was where it started, in Russia in 1941. Zelewski commanded Einsatzgruppen in the early days, and yes, there were terrible things that happened, there can be no argument.
Q- Which other SS leaders come to mind regarding the anti-partisan war?
A- Well, there were so many, but I would say Walter Schimana, who along with Zelewski created the Einsatzgruppen concept of ant-partisan warfare, and he was a favourite of Hitler’s and Himmler’s for his ability to report staggering enemy casualties. I personally did not like him very much, although Zelewski was a charming if somewhat withdrawn character. Bittrich and Steiner were very similar in their characters; both were highly intelligent and rather humane in their handling of enemy prisoners, and were opposed to the Einsatzgruppen actions along with Paul Hausser, and they tried to correct many of the great errors which had turned the populations against us. I liked them both. Herbert Gille was another in that same type of character, elderly, gentlemanly, and full of fight, yet unassuming as a Waffen SS general. He won the Diamonds to the Knights Cross as well, and was a stellar personality and leader. Juergen Stroop was similar to Schimana, but without the intellect or tactical knowledge. He tended to create more problems than resolve, and he was relieved of his duties in the Balkans by Himmler himself through General Ernst Kaltenbrunner. I know of this because I typed the letter ordering Schimana, who had been teaching at the academy in Bad Toelz along with Klingenberg to replace him in Greece, which went through Kaltenbrunner in Vienna. This was 1943.
Q- What was the situation like in the Balkans?
A- It was worse than in Russia, because of the terrain and the many different resistance groups working in the various countries. It was because of this activity that at least fifty divisions were engaged throughout the Balkans occupation and pacification duty, primarily due to partisan activity. Yugo-slavia was to become the greatest problem for the occupation forces, even more so than in Russia, mainly due to the rather static and long-term nature of our occupation. It is a misconception to state that German forces actually occupied the entire country. This would have been impossible. We could only occupy major cities and garrison outposts, but never the entire nation. This failure to occupy the entire nation as well as effectively control the pop-ulation was what helped to create the great problems that later arose. We did not have this problem on such a great scale in other parts of Europe, and this was a question that I think puzzled many senior officers. I don’t think that we were capable of understanding the true nature of the problem.
Q- How did the partisan war develop in Yugoslavia, and what actions were taken?
A- The partisan war had been going on against the Italians before we became involved, and shortly afterward we placed several officers with some experience of sorts within the country, such as Kurt Zeitzler, who was one of the first to try and tackle the problem, but he was relieved of that command soon after. Zeitzler had attempted to control the Croatian units that were creating problems with their actions against Serbs, whom they blamed for atrocities in kind. Zeitzler was not a diplomat, and I think he angered a few people. However, his reassignment was never discussed openly.
Q- Why was that?
A- The planning for Barbarossa had been long and detailed, but it was March (1941) that the final planning stages were in motion. We had planned for an April invasion, but Rudolf Hess’ action delayed the execution. Then we had the Yugoslav problem that required our attention. With the fall of Belgrade we were an occupation force, yet still pushing on to Greece, then Crete fell in May, which further delayed Barbarossa. Hitler was becoming very impatient with all of these actions and wanted them completed quickly. When it came to the assigning of the various field commanders there were many whose names were drawn due to their various areas of expertise. Zeitzler had a great amount of experience against partisans, and it was believed that as a qualified panzer and infantry commander he would have been critical in the opening phase of Barbarossa. I don’t believe that Zeitzler’s failure at containing the problem in Yugoslavia had anything to do with his appointment to the coming Russian campaign. If anything at all it would have been perceived as a promotion and a sign of his stature within the Wehrmacht.
Q- Which units come to mind as being effective in the counterinsurgency operations?
A- Well, there were several, but I would say that the most effective was ‘Florian Geyer’, commanded by Herman Fegelein. This unit was always in the field, serving from Russia to the Balkans, and managed to reduce the greatest number of partisan threats. ‘Prinz Eugen’ was also very effective in Yugoslavia, and this was the basis for Himmler wanting to create ‘Handschar’ and other units recruited from non-Germans. There were also those units that were not as effective, and were in fact counterproductive, such as Kaminsky’s and Dirlewanger’s units. Kaminsky was finally eliminated on Himmler's orders, and Dirlewanger was killed by his own men, I believe, and his command disbanded in 1945.
Q- Why was this?
A- Kaminsky had decided to restore order in several of his units by making examples of the junior commanders. He actually strangled one in front of his men, and acted like a madman. When Himmler learned of the acts he was in a state of shock.
Q- How did Himmler begin the recruiting effort?
A- Himmler realised that we would never be able to maintain the numbers necessary for effectiveness in the Waffen SS, and decided to begin recruiting the auxiliaries. The Western European units had performed very well, such as the Walloons, Danes, Norwegians, and French, so he believed that the same success could be achieved in the east. During the early days it was important to place a humane and very caring face on the recruiting effort. I spoke with Himmler about the eventual expansion of the SS in general and he stated; ‘We will concern ourselves with the Waffen SS,’ as this was 1941, ‘and fill out the ranks with those men we know to be suitable. I would prefer to keep the SD and Gestapo completely German, for security, you understand.’ Himmler was dedicated to creating a greater Germanic community, with the SS being the pinnacle of this new order. As you well now, there was some measure of success.
Q- Would this recruiting include the foreign armies as well?
A- No, this was strictly regarding the Waffen SS. The Army and men like [Wilfried Strik-] Strikfeldt would handle the additional general recruiting. This brings to mind an interesting thing, regarding the additional auxiliaries. The two men most responsible were Strikfeldt and Professor [Dr. Fritz Rudolf] Arlt. Arlt was a very intelligent man who understood the Eastern mind, as did Strikfeldt, but he was not especially supportive of National Socialism, preferring to remain outside of politics. As a professional soldier this would perhaps be understandable, but Arlt was an academic, not a soldier until the war. It was during his period of working for [Reinhard] Heydrich and Hans Frank that Arlt was discovered to be not very enthusiastic in his duties. Frank despised him for being too compassionate. I would say that Arlt was one humanitarian in a world of misery. He requested a combat posting and it was granted, and he was highly decorated and wounded badly. This recuperation period was when he was reassigned to me, and I was his boss in the SS Headquarters Office in early 1944. I was preparing to transfer to Italy, and Arlt was being groomed to take over many of my responsibilities in Berlin, such as recruitment. Arlt offered his opinions on the recruiting campaign and was an exceptional intellect, and very honest in his opinions. Arlt also found many loopholes in the racial regulations. I remember in 1943, before he came to work in my office, that he said 3,000,000 Ukrainians would qualify for recruitment if the restrictions were lessened or redefined. Arlt was also a great supporter of covert operations, such as the Brandenberg units, and under him these units were provided greater flexibility in the counterinsurgency role, as you would put it. There were many people opposed to using the eastern soldiers; they were not trusted. Before this could be effective there had to be great support, and one of the most opposed was [Paul] Hausser. He later changed his mind, and gave a report on their effectiveness in a report during the Office of Eastern Affairs Staff meeting.
Q- Who attended this meeting?
A- Almost everyone involved in the partisan problem; Fegelein, Bach-Zelewski, [Gottlob] Berger, Gille, Kumm, Bittrich, Steiner, myself, Himmler of course, and many others that I cannot remember right now.
Q- What was the purpose of this meeting?
A- This was to decide once and for all whether or not the eastern volunteers would be used on a large scale, and if so how they would be used. There was already a unit, called Abteilung 203 that was using former Soviet officers in a propaganda and commando campaign using partisan tactics. Strikfeldt and Arlt were in charge, along with Soviet officer named Zakharov, I believe this is correct, and I met him once. The Ukrainians were considered the most reliable due to their suffering during Stalin’s activities, and their leader was Shandruk. They wanted to use the name ‘Galizische’ for the units, but Himmler would have none of it at first. Shandruk outlined specific conditions, much like Vlasov, that had to be met if Germany wanted another ally against Stalin in the Ukrainian Nationalist Party. These were self-control and command of all present and future units under Ukrainian officers, freedom for all Ukrainians from prison and concentration camps, and the creation of an independent Ukraine allied to, but not under the domination of Germany. Berlin was not about to agree openly, and this would prove difficult for us later.
Q- So Himmler and Hitler finally supported these conditions?
A- Not at first, but finally Hitler decided to offer anything reasonable to get the Ukrainian support and Himmler, I think, realised the necessity. However, following the speeches made by Vlasov and Malyshkin, Himmler and the General Staff, including Hitler were quite upset. Keitel went into a frenzy and demanded a word for word translation transcript of every word spoken. He also said that [Hasso von] Wedel ‘had better pray Vlasov did not promote himself as the future Russian leader.’ Himmler was even on Keitel’s list, thinking the Reichsfuehrer had been involved. Himmler soon became quite incensed and joined the attack. It looked as if the great free Russian experiment was about to end in firing squads for everyone. There had been reports of desertions from the volunteer ranks, and Hitler wanted an investigation done as to the numbers of Freiwilligen who had actually re-defected as opposed to being recruited from the prison camps. This was in January 1943. As far as I remember, Gehlen headed this investigation and the results were something like 1,300 documented defections, less than one point five percent of the entire volunteer force at that time. The numbers of those who actually defected from the Soviet ranks as opposed to those in the camps was something like eighty percent. Hitler finally allowed the various field commanders to use these troops in the summer of 1943, in time for the Kursk offensive, but he wanted them under direct German command and at all times supervised. I do know that Army Group Centre under [Guenther] von Kluge had the largest elements, and they apparently proved quite useful.
Q- Were there any difficulties in the German officers handling these units?
A- Yes, there were some situations I remember quite clearly, even being an old man. There was a report from Fegelein regarding a Cossack unit on anti-partisan duty, and that the Cossacks were butchering their prisoners, and that a unit from ‘Florian Geyer’ had to intervene. This was becoming even more of a problem later, especially in Yugoslavia and the Caucasus.
Q- Who commanded the Cossacks?
A- The best leader was [Lothar von] Pannwitz, who earned their respect, not an easy job. They even protected him, carrying long sabres, and his personal bodyguard was quite impressive. I met him once with his Praetorian Guard, to discuss his unit transferring to Italy in 1944, and I must admit that I was quite nervous.
Q- How many Soviets served in the German military?
A- I know that over a million served in some capacity, but as far as actually serving in German forces, I would say that the Navy and Air Force had over 40,000 men, with 100,000 in the Army, and a similar number having served in the Waffen SS within their own units. Himmler had been unaware of these figures and the surprise was evident on his face.
Q- How did Berlin react to this information?
A- Basically it was a confused thing. Keitel and Jodl wanted none of it, while several senior SS and Army generals knew that there was a great need for these troops. Himmler had already authorised the recruitment for the SS, so the field commanders took it upon themselves to determine who was and was not acceptable. This was where the large numbers came in. Overall the situation was basically left alone.
Q- How did the war end for you?
A- I was in Italy, but I returned to Berlin a couple of times just before the war ended, as I had certain responsibilities, such as destroying files and documents so the Soviets and Allies would not have them. When I returned in May 1945 I surrendered to the Allies, who put me in prison. After the trial I was sentenced to twenty years, but was out sooner. I was in a cell next to ‘Sepp’ Dietrich for a while and both of us were released within a few days of each other.
Q- Why were you released so early?
A- The Allies were preparing for the coming war with the Soviets, and they wanted all of the experienced senior staff and field officers who had experience to work with their intelligence services, and I did this also, sense I felt that the Soviet threat was the greatest scourge. Sure, we made mistakes, and in retrospect I can see how the world vilified us. But for us it was a war of national survival, and in this kind of war you must do hard things and make tough decisions.
Q- What was your personal opinion of the racial policies and the extermination programme?
Q- I personally felt the same as almost everyone else, that we were superior and that we must remove the dangerous elements from our society. Your country did the same thing with the Indians, and the British all over their empire. Of course, this does not mean that I agreed with the policy against civilians and women and children, but I think that much of that was created as propaganda by the Allies. No one discusses Stalin’s killing millions of his own people, especially the Ukrainians. Why is that? I do not hear much about the Spanish killing Basque populations, or even much regarding the Chinese Communists and their activities. Why are we the ones to get so much attention? I think that it is because we lost the war, and for everyone to have a good feeling someone must be the villain.
Q- How are your later days in retirement?
A- I just relax and attend a few reunions on occasion, trying to forget the past and look towards the future. I have a bad heart so my outdoor activities have been halted, but I do love the mountains and choose to keep a house there. Life is not all bad. I think it is what you make of it.