Otto Kumm
NAME- Otto Kumm
NATION- Germany
DATE (S) OF INTERVIEW (S)- 1980, 1982 (Jeffrey L. Ethell)
February 1984, January 1985 (Colin D. Heaton)
PLACE OF INTERVIEW (S)- Munich, Germany
LANGUAGE (S) CONDUCTED- English, German
SIGNIFICANCE OF SUBJECT- Command and Staff officer, 2nd
SS Division; Commanding Officer of infantry/anti-partisan forces. Waffen SS Major General, holder of Knight’s Cross, Oak Leaves, Swords.
OTHERS IN ATTENDANCE- Interview is a collaboration of interviews conducted by the late historian Jeffrey L. Ethell and Colin D Heaton
FORMAT- Q & A standard.
Q- When were you born?
A- I was born in 1909.
Q- Why did you join the SS?
A- I had been in the army and the SA for a year, and as most of us who were older, and I believed that the SS was the elite, and we were. We received the best training, equipment and had the respect of everyone. People believe that it was a completely political organisation, and in some ways this was true. However, the Waffen SS, as it became known in 1940 was strictly a military arm; shock troops. Also, it is not commonly known that the SS organisation was actually several departments, such as the Gestapo, General SS, Waffen SS, SD, and the SD was divided between the Criminal Police and the Order Police, and other smaller factions. Volunteering for the SS was only the beginning, getting accepted was a different matter. Once you passed the racial heredity and criminal checks, then the physical examinations were relentless. But once you went through several months of this, then the training began. Enlisted men attended the various schools in Germany, while officer candidates attended the SS War Academy at Bad Toelz. This lasted for a year, depending upon the individual and the area of specialisation. There was a master’s degree in war theory that was the equivalent of the United States Command and Staff College, which lasted a year. As the war went on this was later discontinued, and I never attended this in full.
Q- When did you first become involved in anti-partisan warfare?
A- This was in 1942. At this time I was serving with the ‘Der Fuehrer’
Regiment of ‘Das Reich’ as a company commander, and we were ordered to locate and destroy the partisan forces. The problem we had was that we were not accus-tomed to seeking out an enemy and giving chase, since the Soviet soldiers fought bravely and usually until they were either captured, killed or out of ammunition. I was working with an officer named [Fritz Rudolf] Arlt, a professional academic who was very enlightened in his thought and approach to the problem, this was during the Kharkov battle of February 1943, when we were constantly under Red Army and partisan attacks. Arlt was severely wounded and he was sent to Berlin. This actually turned out to be fortunate for us, as he managed to command some influence over the ever-changing doctrine, working with Karl Wolff.
Q- What was the partisan war like?
A- The partisans operated as a hit and run unit, firing a few shots, dropping back, firing again, luring our men into ambushes and trying to penetrate our flanks. Some even carried radios to call artillery and air strikes against us. Finally, we decided on a tactic of probing forward with a squad, followed by a platoon, which would be flanked by a platoon on either side. Once the partisans fired the centre squad would give chase, dropping to fire as the following centre platoon rushed through under covering fire. The two flanking platoons were in radio contact with the rest, so depending upon which way the partisans ran, the facing platoon would stand fast while the entire formation would pivot around behind the enemy, chasing them into the line of fire of the stationary unit. This plan worked very well, and once the enemy were engaged the platoons would call artillery fire behind the partisans preventing their escape, forcing them to stand and fight. This was when heavy weapons would take over, and the artillery would be walked back into the partisan unit. It took a few practices to get this down to a proper format, but it proved to be quite effective. The circle would grow smaller, constricting the ring until the surviving partisans broke for cover, and we allowed an avenue of escape that was fire free. Once they made for it we had them. It was like gathering ants by burning their perimeter, forcing them into the ever-tightening circle. The few who attempted to leave got burned, while the rest would group together to find moral support or security in their closeness. This we exploited by bombing, artillery or machine gun fire, but it was always a costly tactic employed by the best method of containment and liquidation we ever used. It is interesting to note that most of these tactics we developed in the field; Berlin did not take any great notice, not even when Bach-Zelewski was in overall command of all anti-partisan operations in Russia. Himmler and the General Staff knew what we were doing and they wanted reports, but they were very non-committal in their support, such as in weapons and troop allocations. They expected commanders to simply take the soldiers they needed from whatever units were available, usually a couple of companies totaling about 200 men; basically a reinforced motorised company and this would not work. Men needed to be trained and rehearsed in this type of warfare. One does not simply jump right into a new method of waging war without learning and practising. These men had to work together, know each other and rely upon each other, and this type of unit integrity is not quickly thrown together.
Q- How prepared was the German army to handle insurgencies throughout Europe?
A- We were not prepared at all for the partisan problem as it grew, especially in Russia and Yugoslavia. Our professional officers’ training, and that of the army and Waffen SS, since more than half of the Waffen SS were comprised of former army soldiers did not include military action against civilian or irregular forces. This was not even a concept at this time, since prior to the Second World War there had been static warfare, much like in the First World War. With the new war it was highly mobile, covering ground more quickly and bringing much more territory and more people under our control. Also, another and more dangerous problem was that we now had the Soviet Union to contend with and its great mass of people. It should have been foreseen that we would have future problems with guerrilla fighters, but this was simply an oversight that we tried to remedy too late with too little.
Q- Who were the greatest or most influential members of the anti-partisan war, in your opinion?
A- Well, Bach-Zelewski was appointed as overall commander in the early days of the Soviet invasion, but his methods were rather crude compared to how we later conducted operations. I would have to say that the most successful field commanders were Fegelein and Schimana, both of whom were absolutely fanatical in their pursuit of the bandits. Gustav Lombard was another person who was to earn accolades in the anti-partisan war, serving under Fegelein until getting his own division in 1945. Schimana also taught the course on anti-partisan warfare at Bad Toelz, and we all attended at one time. This was the first attempt to make this type of warfare a legitimate course of instruction, and it was needed badly. One of our greatest detriments was the lack of direct radio communications with Berlin, as well as higher Command and Staff authority in a timely fashion in order to have the necessary permission to operate in a certain way. When working with army units and our Hungarian, Romanian, Bulgarian, or Italian allies this became critical.
Q- What in your opinion was the greatest detriment to successfully converting the populations to the National Socialist way of thinking?
A- Without question the anti-Jewish and forced work policies. Naturally the destruction of villages, killing people even if proven to be partisans rapidly destroyed our credibility and increased the resistance against us. This was true all over Europe, not just in Russia. What was perhaps the worst thing for us was the narrow-minded approach; as a collective military body used in handling these problems. The lessons should have been learned much sooner, but unfortunately this was not to be the case. There were many senior officers who were opposed to these activities, such as Hausser, Bittrich, [Johannes] Blaskowitz, and even army commanders such as Zeitzler and Manteuffel. Hausser and Bittrich voiced their opposition publicly during a high level staff meeting of ranking SS officers, which included Fegelein, Herbert Gille, Kurt Steiner, Hans Frank, Gottlob Berger, Heinrich Mueller, Strikfeldt, Wolff, and Theodor Eicke. The army was represented by Henning von Tresckow, Count Stauffenberg, and others. I was there as well since I had been recently promoted to major and was commanding a battalion at this time. Himmler called the meeting, which was to discuss the partisan problem, but also the problem with the recruiting of the Ukrainians and Free Russians and other eastern peoples into the Waffen SS.
Q- How did the average anti-partisan mission come about?
A- Once a partisan unit was located, the senior planning staff would gather the necessary intelligence, which included ground and aerial observation reports. Maps were always being updated, which is a requirement for everyone, not just us, and the orders sent down the chain of command, although the men were usually kept uninformed as to the specific nature of the operation, especially if the mission included outright elimination of Jews and Communist sympathisers. We needed to know that in the event of success, would the same formula work in Yugoslavia as that applied to Russia? These were all very interesting questions and we had very little time to attempt trial and error. Once we were given a plain language table of organisation and equipment with tactics outlined, we felt better prepared for tackling the partisan problem. However, we had been improvising with our own methods, and these new tactics were unique; they were handed down as a guideline, not engraved in stone, offering us the opportunity to use the new methods in conjunction with the previous method. We were even encouraged to write reports on our missions and make recommendations. Another unique part of this plan was that everyone, even the lowest rank was to give input though the
chain of command so that every perspective was covered. It was a wonderful
method of waging warfare, but it never resolved the problem of halting the
constant flood of partisans that seemed to pop up like mushrooms after a
summer rain. Other officers made recommendations that were finally taken
seriously and placed into the doctrine. This was how important Berlin finally
took the partisan problem. Unfortunately, little in the way of a clear definition
was ever provided.
Q- Were you ever able to work out the problems with the eastern volunteers being assigned to German units within your own command?
Q- We rarely used them in ‘Das Reich’, although they were formed into their own regiments and even divisions. The Western European units, such as the French, Walloon, Flemish, Norwegian and Danish SS units proved extremely reliable. We were a little uncertain about the Russians and even the Italians, whose combat effectiveness had been less than stellar. However, once Vlasov was brought into the operation we began to recruit an extremely high calibre of former Red Army soldiers. The problem was that Berlin did not take this matter very seriously. Look at the situation. The idleness of 600,000 men prepared to fight against their former comrades with another 200,000 wasting away in prison camps exemplified the total incompetence of the High Command. Felix Steiner was incensed that his plan had been shelved, as he was relying upon the Vlasov Army to support our forces in the offensive. By the time we actually launched the attack Soviet forces outnumbered us heavily and were prepared. It was such a waste.
Q- What were some of the more successful and interesting Freiwilligen units?
A- Well, the Vlasov Army was quite unique, although it came into the war far too late to really be effective. However, the unit that perhaps commanded the most respect from us and fear from the Soviets was the Cossacks. Pannwitz’ Cossacks had developed a reputation for combat effectiveness that garnered them respect, yet there had to be an established limit to the killing, especially if the Russians were to be recruited for the Vlasov Army. Decades of hatred had been unleashed, and the programme was in serious jeopardy. The Cossacks were not a light-hearted people when it came to war; they were trained from the cradle to ride and fight. Their cavalry and marksmanship qualities were excellent by any standard, although their formation discipline was not quite to Red Army let alone German standards, but they bore no resemblance to disciplined conventional front-line units. Once they were German trained in anti-partisan warfare they were virtually unstoppable. I once told Fegelein; ‘God help us if they ever learned that we were destined to sell them out.’ Fegelein agreed. I had actually worked on the recruitment programme under General [Ernst] Koestring in converting and recruiting those considered to be anti-Bolshevik. Another group was the Kabardians, just as ruthless and great fighters. Interestingly enough, Pannwitz was loved by his Cossacks, and his personal bodyguard were quite impressive, and drew their long swords whenever anyone approached him, even senior generals.
Q- So the efforts of the lower echelon leaders and division commanders was useless without support from Berlin?
A- Absolutely. Himmler always had maintained these silly racial criteria for acceptance into the German military, with even higher standards for the SS and Waffen SS. As you know he kept lowering these standards as the war went on to fill the ranks, even creating the ‘Handschar’ Division. If Berlin genuinely cared about winning the war in the east they would have completely supported the recruiting plans and maintained a reign on the Einsatzgruppen activities. Hitler’s dream was a united Europe that would eclipse and destroy Communism, yet the greatest potential weapon in his inventory was the massive Russian population. Had he taken the situation seriously and logically analysed the realities, we would not be having this conversation today. It was unbelievably stupid and was, in my opinion, the reason why we lost the war in total.
Q- Having been a member of the Waffen SS General Staff and War Planning Division, you knew nearly all of the key players. What was your impression of Himmler?
A- Himmler was an amazingly friendly and positive thinking person, a man driven by ambition, yet able to speak and relate to even the lowest private. He had a phenomenal memory, much like Hitler, and was able to recall even the smallest details of a conversation at a later date. Had it not been for his active commanding role in the liquidation, which was unfortunately a flawed policy that we must bear, I think Himmler would have been remembered in history as a great administrative genius.
Q- Speaking of Hitler, how well did you know him?
A- Well, I never really knew him, and I don’t think most people who were acquainted with him could say they truly knew him, but this is my opinion. I met him several times, such as the awarding of the Oak Leaves and later the Swords. I spoke with him about the Kharkov operation, as well as the planning on Operation Citadel, which was the brainchild of Felix Steiner. When Hitler came to Vinnitza I met him as an aide to Paul Hausser, I believe. This was 1943, or thereabouts. I found him very astute and knowledgeable, and keenly interested in what we were doing. He seemed to be especially occupied with the reports regarding the partisan problem, and how we were dealing with it. When I was wounded the third time I met him again, along with Goebbels, who I could not tolerate. I did not think much of him at all.
Q- Who were some of the generals you admired, and which ones did you question regarding their capabilities?
A- Well, I must admit that we may not have had as great a leadership as the army in the early days of the war, but as the years went by we did have men who rose through the ranks. Some of the best tacticians were SS men, while the strategists were mostly in the army. This may sound strange, but if you think about it, this makes total sense. The SS was a tactical shock force, used as a fire brigade wherever the battle was the thickest and therefore the leadership needed to be tactically sound. As we were subordinated to army units until 1942, strategic thinking was not necessary. However, men like Felix Steiner were rare in any military force. He was on the planning staffs for many of the war’s great operations, such as Barbarossa and Citadel. Steiner was always at odds with Himmler, Hitler and others, and he and Jodl hated each other. ‘Sepp’ Dietrich was a capable leader insofar as he knew how to place the best officers in command positions to get the job done. He relied upon others, but he also rewarded those who rose to the occasion, and his many victories were directly attributed to his selections for command positions. Eicke was basically a ruthless leader, and was very lucky to have good men under him. He was one of the most unpopular officers in the Waffen SS, and his men feared him. I would say that Wilhelm Bittrich, Paul Hausser and Steiner were probably the best minds in the field. Paul Hausser was my favourite; he was loved by everyone. He genuinely cared for his men. I remember after Kursk, when the wounded were being prepared to entrain to Germany, he had his driver take him to the railhead. Getting out of his car he ordered a large bag and two boxes to brought out, and he personally handed out Wound Badges in the respective grades to the men, and personally signed off these and additional awards in their pay books. He also personally decorated several men with the Knight’s Cross and Iron Cross. I know this from a friend of mine who was there. Hausser went to a badly wounded man whose arms had been ripped off when his tank exploded. The man was half-delirious, but he wanted to write a letter to his wife and family before he either arrived home or died. Hausser, a full SS general personally took dictation and wrote the letter for him. When he asked for the address, he was shocked to learn that the man lived only a few blocks from his own family, then residing in Berlin, I think. Hausser had to go to Berlin and he personally carried almost fifty kilograms of letters for the men, and delivered the armless soldier’s letter personally. That was the kind of man he was. Herbert Gille was another great inspiration in the field, and he won the Diamonds.
Q- Who in your opinion were the least competent?
A- I do not want to denigrate anyone; under the conditions everyone did the best they could. However, given this, I believe that Theodor Eicke, despite his winning the Oak Leaves and being a brave man in the field was not suited for field command. He was just not of the same calibre as the others I have mentioned. Another man better off not leading large numbers of troops in the field was Bronislav Kaminsky, whom I met briefly, but his reputation preceded him. His removal was no loss.
Q- In your opinion, what was the greatest failure of the German military in achieving all of Hitler’s objectives?
A- We managed to secure nearly all of the military objectives given us. Where we failed we were not properly supported; the military needed more supplies, better-motorised organisation with regard to the infantry, and greater production capabilities from the armaments industry. In all we should have been on a dedicated wartime production schedule from the first day, not waiting four years to gear up the industry to catch up with the allies, which was never going to happen. There were other problems also, such as the fact that we had the best overall equipment, but we still used the 1898 Mauser action rifle that was used in the First World War, while our enemies had developed semi-automatic weapons, such as the American M-1. Another problem was our policies. We in the field military units were to suffer from the constant presence of the death squads, which were creating problems faster than we could alleviate them. True, we had great problems with partisans all over Europe, but these were problems that we could have handled and converted to our advantage early on. We failed to seize the opportunity, and that was perhaps the greatest tragedy.