INTERVIEW WITH GENERAL
JAMES H. DOOLITTLE
In
1984 General Adolf Galland was asked; “Which Allied Air Force Commander do you
believed help defeat Germany during the war.” Galland lowered his glass, thought
for a second and said: “That would be James Doolittle. He caused me many
headaches during the war, but I do like him very much today.” From so worthy an
opponent there can be no higher praise.
Doolittle was a renegade from the start; believing that there was always a
better way to accomplish a task, or a more effective way to complete a mission.
He always pushed his men to be their best, while never slowing down his own
pace, even when he was twice their age. When America needed a real hero he was
there for us, although his modesty would have never allowed him to accept any of
the credit alone.
James H. Doolittle’s life is more remarkable and stranger than the best fiction.
He has played the role of miner, racing pilot, doctor of aeronautical
engineering, war hero, air force commander, tactician, strategist, hunter, Medal
of Honor recipient, yet was always simply a good and humble man. All who have
known him or served with him praised his virtues and cherished his ideals.
This
abridged interview is a compilation of discussions that transpired between 1984
and 1993 after several years of sporadic contact, thanks to the late actor and
Air Force Reserve Brigadier General James M. Stewart. During this period General
Doolittle was working with historian Carroll V. Glines to produce his amazing
autobiography, I Could Never Be So Lucky Again, which was used as a
reference source for the accuracy of names and locations. Many thanks to C.V.
Glines for helping General Doolittle produce such a fabulous work.
This interview
is dedicated to all of the men who took the great risk on April 18, 1942 to
strike a blow for freedom on their mission to Tokyo.
Q: When
and where were you born Sir?
A: I
dropped in on December 14, 1896 in California, and my father soon moved the
family to
Alaska. This was on the heels of the gold rush.
Q: What
was your childhood like?
A: Well,
I was an only child, and growing up around Nome and the mining towns
was an
experience. You had to be tough in many ways just to survive. There was
no electricity,
and we burned wood and coal to stay warm and cook. The wood
came from crates
and ships that wrecked; some shipments from the States. It was
a dangerous area
for certain. There were saloons, prostitutes, everything. The real
wild west. There
was no law to speak of; everyone carried weapons and they used
them. Gambling
was rampant and crime increased with the growing population,
as happens in
societies. I was always in fights with other boys. I was short for my
age and that
made me a target. After a while I had a reputation, since I had
adopted a
preemptive strike mentality early on. That has probably saved my life
over the decades
more often than not.
Q: Tell
us about your family?
A: Well, my son James Jr. was born in 1920 and his brother John was born
in 1922.
Both were good boys and each became an Air Force Pilot, and I have to say that
no father could have been prouder. But I think Joe deserved most of the credit.
Q: What
was your education like?
A: Well,
my fighting ability was not matched by my academic performance. I was
not a very good
student, which I think was due to my attraction to hunting and the
outdoors. I had
a job selling the local newspaper to make some money. In 1908
we moved to Los
Angeles where we had some relatives, and the warmth and
modern world
were a marvel to me. I was enrolled at Barendo Elementary and
then attended
Los Angeles manual arts high school in 1910.
Q: You
had some famous classmates at that time, didn’t you?
A: Yes,
Goodwin Knight was later a California governor, and Frank Capra, who we
all know of
course. We became friends from those days forward.
Q: What
started your interest in flying?
A: I
went to the Dominguez Air Field, which is today in Compton, just outside LA.
This was 1910.
This was when I first saw Glen Curtiss and other famous aviators.
I then decided
to make a glider, and I followed the instructions in an old Popular
Mechanics. My
mother sewed the fabric for my biplane adventure, although I
think she was
reluctant to provide me with any encouragement. This thing was
more like a hang
glider, and I took it to a small bluff with a fifteen foot rise. I ran
and jumped but
the tail struck and sent me crashing. Undeterred I decided that I
needed more
speed. I had a friend tow me behind his father’s car with a rope, but
I never got
airborne and was dragged quite a ways. My glider was destroyed, and
I was very lucky
myself.
Q: That
did not stop you?
A: No, I
decided to take the remains and build a monoplane glider with bicycle
wheels and an
engine.
Q: How
did that work out?
A: I
gave up and took up boxing, and a teacher, Mr. Bailey taught me the finer
points. I had
the attitude but not the skill. I entered amateur boxing matches and
won fights, and
won the West Coast Amateur Championship in 1912 as a
flyweight. Later
as I grew and put on more weight I entered the bantam class. I
did exhibitions
with Eddie Campi and Kid Williams, names familiar to boxing
historians, and
I did all right. However, I did get into a fight once that put me in
jail, and that
taught me a valuable lesson. I was charged with disturbing the peace,
but facing my
mother after a weekend in jail was the worse.
Q: Did
that end your boxing days?
A: Well,
no. My mother bought me a motorcycle as a way of getting me to qui
boxing, but all
that did was make getting around to the matches and training all the easier. I
began boxing as a professional under the name of Jimmy Pierce to
make some money.
Q: Tell
us how you met your wife?
A: I met
Joe (Josephine) during this time, and she was the first and only love of my
life. I can’t
say her family were too enamored with me, and even my mother thought she
could do better. She was not a fan of my lifestyle but we worked it
out. I returned
to Alaska later for a while, then returned to LA and enrolled in Los
Angeles Junior
College in 1915. Then I went to the University Of California to
study mine
engineering, where I also boxed for the school and again as a professional,
before settling down to my studies. We were married on December 24, 1917.
Q: What
did you do after that?
A: I
went to work for the Sierra Nevada Mining Company during one summer to
gain practical
experience. We had two guys killed in an accident, and there were many things that awakened me to the dangers of deep shaft mining.
Q: How
did World War I effect you?
A: Well,
like most men I enlisted and returned to UC where I reported for flight
ground training.
I took to the courses, which included meteorology, Morse-code
aerodynamics,
mathematics, mechanics, navigation, all of the prerequisites. And
this was great,
because up to that point I had been unemployed, and they paid me
fifty dollars
per month. After graduation I went to San Diego for flight training. I
graduated on
March 5, 1918.
Q: What
was your next assignment?
A: I
went to camp Dick, Texas, which was like a kind of punishment for me. There
was nothing to
do, no planes, nothing. I wanted to go overseas and see some
action, but no
joy. Then we went to Hoboken, New Jersey, where Frank Sinatra is
from, then to
Dayton, Ohio, then to Lake Charles, Louisiana. This was finally all
right with me
since we did our advance training in the S-4C Scout, which I liked
better than the
old Jenny since it was faster.
Q: There
was once an incident when you were reported dead. Tell us about that,
please.
A: Yes,
this was when a former Lafayette Escadrille pilot named James R.
Doolittle
was killed in
Buffalo, New York, and Joe was notified by some reporter that I was
dead. She did
not believe it, and after some confusion I called her. She knew
better, as I
informed her of where I was and I had not been in New York.
Q: Where
was your next assignment?
A: I
went to Rockwell Field in San Diego. This was a nice place, although I was
stuck there as a
gunnery instructor. Not much to it really. We used the Jenny with
the top mounted
Lewis gun firing over the propeller for training, pretty simple
really. However,
I did have a mid-air collision there while I was flying with a
student pilot in
a jenny. This fellow came up at us in a Scout and removed my
landing gear,
which was a little unsettling. The crash damaged the propeller and
lower wing, but
that poor fellow lost his head, literally, and we lost his plane but I
landed without
much incident. Joe saw this incident in the local paper in Los
Angeles also.
Not long after I had another collision and my prop tore off a student
pilots tail, and
we lost both plane and pilot. Very sad. Later I was assigned to the
Mexican border
as part of our security flights. This was in 1919, not long after the
Pershing
expeditions into Mexico due to Pancho Villa’s raids. This was a crazy
assignment,
since we could not fire on the Mexican bandits even if they fired on
us, and we had a
pilot killed by ground fire. I promised myself that I would do
everything
within my power to protect my pilots and crews from such ridiculous-
ness if I ever
rose to command status. Instead of shooting them we flew low to
stampede their
cattle and just raise general hell. After that I went back to Kelly
Field a year
later. After a few long-range flights and temporary assignments I
went back to
Dayton.
Q: Why
did you stay in the Army rather than go back to school after the war?
A: I
really enjoyed flying and it was something that I was good at. When you enjoy
doing something
and your damned good at it, you should stay with it. Besides, I
felt safer at
the controls of an aircraft than in a deep mine shaft. At least in a plane
you can have
some measure of control over your fate. I also liked the military life,
it suited me. I
did go later on and finish school.
Q: How
did you get into barnstorming?
A: Well,
I never did barnstorming, that would not have been allowed, although the
Army allowed us
to set new speed and altitude records which made the aviation
corps look good
in the press. There were some struggles in Congress about
restricting
funds for the air branch. Once the war was over the powers that be
decided to cut
back on military spending, which I have always considered a bad
strategic move.
The guys who did barnstorming were the guys who got out of the
service and
tried to make a living the best way they could. The first show I did
was in San
Diego, and it was a big one, over 200 airplanes, and we had a great
time. We also
went on a nationwide air tour with many different types of aircraft
in 1919, and
this was the most fun time of all. I did get into airplane racing, which
was wonderful. I
practiced for the Schneider Cup, which was only open to sea-
planes, and I
flew my first one in October 1925. This was truly international in
that the
British, Italians and our various service branches involved. This was a
very prestigious
event, by the way and many careers were launched by this and
the Pulitzer
races. I won the Schneider that year and it gave Army aviation a real
shot in the arm.
Q: When
was your first crash?
A: I
buzzed a couple of guys and hit a fence, totaling the plane, and my CO grounded
me for a month.
I walked away from that one, no problem. I guess that was when I began
to believe I had a charmed life. This is not to say that I thought I was
invincible, though. My next crash was during our attempt at taking
three Jennys
cross-country.
None of the three made it, and I ground looped mine in a freshly
plowed field.
The prop was bent, but we had a spare, and the tail was quickly
repaired, so we
returned to our base at Rockwell without further mishap. The next
crash was when I
was chasing ducks in a Jenny and I crashed the tail on a ridge.
That was
slightly embarrassing, and personally painful when I reported to my CO
again. The next
was a crash in Florida, where I was taking off on the beach and a
wheel stuck in
the sand. I was turned around and a wave hit the landing gear,
flipping me
over. The plane was a wreck. Joe was there for that one. I did
eventually
finish the flight from Florida to California. In 1924 I broke the tail on
Fokker
but landed it. I later crashed another Jenny at MIT. In all my flying I
only
made three
parachute jumps from aircraft. Some might say those were three too
many.
Q: You
had a reputation for getting into trouble, perhaps that was a great part of your
charm?
A: Well,
Colin, I will tell you that my CO, Colonel Burwell had many reasons to be
irate with me.
Once I pulled a stunt that was completely illegal; doing some wing
walking and
other things for stunts, and Cecil B. DeMille caught me on camera.
My CO found out
about really quickly. He saw the film of me sitting there on the
landing gear
under John McCullough’s plane, and he grounded me for another
month. Then as
if my bad luck runneth over, I was on duty during this period, so
the only
enjoyment I had was riding my motorcycle. I saw a plane coming in to
land and I drove
in its path, so the pilot had to go around. I did it again as a joke.
The pilot
happened to be my CO, so there I was grounded for another month and
restricted to
base. I gave my wife a ride, which was against regulations, and if I
had been caught
that would have been the end of me for sure. But I was always a
risk taker. I
think any good combat or test pilot has to be.
Q: What
made you want to become an aeronautical engineer?
A: I
always believed that aircraft designers and pilots should work together to make
the best
aircraft possible. So, using this logic I thought that I should better my
own
understanding of aerodynamics from the scientific point of view. I believe
that this was
the best decision I could have made. I also believed that with proper
training and
preparation a pilot could fly in any kind of weather, and with the
development of
newer instrumentation, instrument flying was to become all
important, and I
wanted to prove it. After I received my BA I was accepted to
MIT for the
masters program, which I started in 1923. I must say that without
Joe’s help as
both a wife and a secretary I could not have accomplished the course
in the time I
did. God bless her for that. My thesis was to test and explain stress
loads on
aircraft, using a combination of mathematical and personal observations
and calculations
relative to G-forces placed upon both the pilot and the airframe.
This had not
been done before, at least not that that extent. I finished my masters
and the thesis
was later published and I suppose I became a sort of celebrity
abroad, but here
it was basically ignored. Then I began to think about a doctoral
program since I
still had a year on my leave from the Army. I submitted my
proposal on wind
velocity’s effects upon aircraft performance, and MIT gave me
the nod.
However, my first draft was rejected. They wanted more formulas and
less personal
observations in order to reinforce my findings, which was something of a
setback, but I chose to make it an obstacle to overcome. I finished in 1925.
Q: You
give a lot of credit to your wife. How did she handle the war later?
A: Well,
I have to say that she was one of the best soldiers I ever knew. With her
sons and husband
off fighting the war she became active in several charities,
giving speaking
tours, that sort of thing. She even made quite a lot of money from
her speaking
engagements, but you know she never kept anything above her own
expenses. With
the money she was given by various groups and corporations she
created the
Doolittle Fund. This was part of the Air Force Aid Society that helped
widows and
children of aircrew who were killed, a very worthwhile organization.
Joe and Bea
Arnold [wife of Gen. Henry ‘Hap’ Arnold] ran that operation. Joe
was also heavily
involved in the support network of wives and returning airmen
who had been
terribly wounded and undergoing rehabilitation. She spoke with the
young wives,
helped them through the turmoil, really being as much a mentor as a
guidance
counselor of sorts. I can’t tell you how proud I was of her when I
learned of these
things later. In 1944 she christened the aircraft carrier USS
Shangri-La,
named for the place where president Roosevelt had stated to the
world our Tokyo
flight had originated from.
Q: You
were also involved in parachute testing, were you not?
A: I was
there but there were others who were the chute experts, although we used to
do jumps at air
shows. We once dropped a dummy that burned into the ground,
and that got us
more than a little attention form some ground observers who
thought that a
man had died. However, given that, the gains made in testing
undoubtedly
saved thousands of lives in years to come, and of that I am very
proud. I did
test flight for altitude and distance, testing the endurance of various
aircraft models.
We tried any gimmick we could think of to get funding for long
distance
flights, but we met a lot of resistance. There were other tests I did, such
as flying with
the turn bank indicator invented by Elmer Sperry, the same fellow
who invented
many aviation milestones, including the famous ball turret on our
bombers, the
artificial horizon and gyroscope. I was also pleased that I had
finally
completed an outside loop. I wanted to know how much stress a plane and
especially the
pilot could take. Flying under the hood was a great way to prove the
worth of
instrument flying over great distance and inclement weather.
Q: What
was the main reason for deciding to strike back at Japan shortly after Pearl
Harbor?
A: It
was understood that there had to be some sort of response, if for nothing else
than to lift
American morale. But more importantly it was necessary to show
Japan that they
were not untouchable. Exposing their vulnerability was in itself a
major part of
the operation. I was under no illusion that we would strike any
major blow with
regard to tactical, let alone strategic damage with our bombers.
The purpose was
psychological all the way around, and I think it worked. I know
it worked for
our nation.
Q: How
did you train the group for this mission?
A: Well,
this story is legendary now, but back then it was one of our most secret
operations. We
practiced every method of flight planning and preparation. This
included
navigation, short take-offs, applying proper trim and mixture for
sustained
long-range flight, as well as fuel conservation. This is over simplifying
the process of
course. The selection process was also vigorous, but this had to be the case.
Back in those days we did not have the real time intelligence to enable us to
comprehend the enemy situation rapidly. For us anything within a few days was
good intelligence. Now a days anything over a few hours is almost worthless.
Q: What
was the basic plan for the mission?
A: Well,
following training and the various qualifications and selections of the air
crews, including
the practice runs at Eglin, the plan was hardly complicated. Once
the Navy, in
particular the USS Hornet closed to within about 400-500 miles of
the Japanese
home islands we would launch the strike with the B-25’s. The plan
was to hit the
heart of Tokyo in one pass, then run along the south coast and head
to China. The
destination was Chuchow, where we would land, refuel and head on
to Chunking,
which was another 800 miles but well within our range, which was
2,400 miles if
all went well. The longest distance we were intending to fly was
about 2,000
miles, and we modified the bombers for this. Once the mission was
over we were to
fly the airplanes to Burma and hand them over to our forces
there.
Q: How
did the weather become a factor?
A:
Weather is always a factor in any military operational planning. The good thing
was that we were
able to compensate for many factors, such as rain and high
winds once we
were airborne. The navigators would have a hard job
compensating for
drift and calculating airspeed, since there would be no land
marks until we
reached Japan, and then none after that until we reached China
almost 100 miles
away. The weather that day was not promising. The seas had
been very high
and we were in a storm with high seas that lasted all through the
previous day.
The rain had been heavy, and winds were also high. This was a
concern. The
morning of the raid the USS Enterprise sent out a scout plane and it
had seen a
Japanese fishing boat, which the pilot believed spotted him. This of
course altered
our flight plan and we had to launch early. Later another Japanese
vessel was
spotted from the Hornet. Then another vessel was sighted and Admiral
Halsey ordered
the USS Nashville to sink it. We had intercepted a radio trans-
mission, and
this was not welcomed news I can assure you.
Q: What
were your thoughts during this time?
A: Last
minute changes to a well-laid plan are never good, especially when the
launch forced us
to take off much further out than we had planned on. Since we
were not
schedules to take off until that afternoon, the alarm informing us to
launch at 0800.
We were lucky, since the speed of the Hornet coupled with the
thirty mile per
hour headwind meant that we should have plenty of lift.
Q: Please
describe the difficulty of that launch.
A: Well,
the deck was pitching up and down, and the most important person in our
lives during
this process was the deck launch officer. We would have to focus
upon him, and
when the deck cleared a swell and rose that was when the signal to
take off would
be given. When my crew and I were in the B-25, we fired up the
engines and
checked the instruments. The mechanics, especially Sergeant Paul J.
Leonard had
meticulously gone over the planes. Nothing was left to chance. Dick
Cole and I were
very confident in our crew. Our navigator was Hank Potter, who
was an
outstanding individual and navigator. With him we had no doubts that we
would find all
of the known points. Having such a crew is a great comfort. After
we lifted off I
knew that the others would have no problems.
Q: What
was the bombing run like?
A:
Pretty uneventful, with exception to a Japanese boat that we passed right over
since we were
flying at 200 feet. Following this, with the weather and visibility
getting better
we flew a few alternate headings to avoid Japanese forces that may
have detected
us, and to prevent further detection. As we approached I decided
that an approach
from the north would be the best, as we could continue on the
southerly
heading I had planned for. This would also hopefully allow us to avoid
the
anti-aircraft batteries. The only aircraft we saw were some biplane trainers, I
guess. No
fighters that I saw until later when we spotted nine, and they did not
approach us,
which meant that we were probably not expected. As we raced over
the tops of the
buildings I saw the factories that were our targets. I climbed to
1,200 feet and
ordered the Bombay doors opened, and our bombardier, Fred
Braemer let our
ordinance go.
Q: How
many bombs did you carry per plane?
A: We
only carried four 500 lb. Bombs due to the weight restrictions and to
compensate for
the weight of the fuel we had to carry. Like I said, this was not a
major tactical
or strategic strike like what would come later. As we flew through
the smoke and
dust we headed for the coast. Then we had another problem; Hank
Potter
determined we would run out of fuel long before we reached the Chinese
mainland, so I
had to make plans for ditching. After seeing sharks below I rapidly
thought about an
alternative plan. We were lucky that the headwind turned into a
tailwind, and
that is always a plus when you are trying to gain time and cover
more distance on
limited resources. I thought that with these factors we may be
able to make the
mainland. If so, then we would jump. The weather was closing in
again and rain
and light fog was making visibility difficult. We tried to reach
Chuchow on the
radio, but that did not work, so we jumped out after I placed the
aircraft on
autopilot.
Q: How
long were you in the air total?
A: We
flew for thirteen hours, and that says a lot about our aircraft and the
marvelous work
performed by the mechanics. It also says something about the
quality of
American workmanship also. I do remember that I had forgotten to
lower the flaps
prior to bailing out, but hindsight is worthless once you are under
a parachute.
Q: This
was not your first jump, was it?
A: No,
this was my third. In 1926 I had broken my ankles in South America during a
trip to Chile,
and this thought was in my head, because I knew that survival and
escape would be
difficult enough without serious injuries. But this jump was very
smooth and I
landed in a soft rice paddy. Muddy, but unhurt, and I thought about
all of the other
men and hoped they would have the same luck. You have been in
Asia, and you
know the odor of those rice paddies, since many times they fertilize
with human
excrement. As I looked I saw a light and went towards it. I stated
that I was an
American in the Chinese we were taught, but the people inside
locked the door
and turned out the light. That tended to make you uncomfortable.
Besides, I
always had reservations about trusting the Chinese with keeping
secrets. Chiang
Kai-Shek was not known for his ability to maintain security
discipline, and
I was hoping that there would not be a reception committee for us.
Q: Greg
Boyington felt the same way, he never trusted Chiang either. What
happened next?
A: Well,
I was freezing, as it was cold and I was wet; a bad combination. I was also
very hungry. I
knew my men would be in at least similar if not worse
circumstances,
and this was my greatest concern. I walked until I met a man who
spoke no
English, but he seemed to understand, and I followed him to a military
garrison. There
was a Chinese major who wanted my Colt .45, which I refused to
hand over. I
told my story, and the officer and his men followed me back to where
I landed. After
seeing that the parachute was gone, I pointed to the house where I
had knocked.
There the farmer and his wife denied anyone knocking, and said
they heard no
plane and saw no parachute. The major accused me of lying, until a
couple of
soldiers came out of the house with my parachute. This eased things a
bit.
Q: What
happened with your crew?
A: The
soldiers found all of them, and the only injury was Potter, who sprained an
ankle. This was
very relieving. We later found the wreckage of our Mitchell but
there was
nothing to salvage. I felt that the entire mission had been a failure. I
knew that none
of the other planes could have made it to the airstrip at Chuchow.
I thought that I
may even face a court-martial. Paul Leonard tried to cheer me up,
and his comments
were almost prophetic. He told me that they would make me a
general and give
me the Medal of Honor, and I thought that perhaps he had landed
on his head. We
had managed to salvage a motion picture camera and a still
camera, but the
others in the other aircraft were destroyed.
Q: How
did you learn of the fates of the other crews?
A: We
found out through intelligence and some of the guys who were later returned.
One crew had
been captured by Chinese guerrillas, more than likely the
Communists, and
were bound and robbed. Later everything was ironed out. We
also heard that
eight of the men had been captured by the Japanese. This was
loosely depicted
in the film The Purple Heart, in case you are interested. We also
met an American
missionary named John Birch who had managed to evade
capture, and
helped us out, and we made Chuchow by variable means eventually.
We knew from
another crew that one man and died on bailing out. Birch was later
killed by the
Chinese Communists after the war, and the John Birch Society is
named after him.
He was a fine man I thought. We learned that five of my men
were in Russia
Q: What
happened later?
A: Well,
to make a long story short, the press went wild about the event after it was
over and
President Roosevelt wanted to see me, so I went to the White House.
This was when Paul’s prediction came true. I was promoted to brigadier general
from light
colonel, passing a grade, which was rare. I felt proud of my boys also,
they had done
all the hard work, really. It was really their moment to shine. Of
course, it was
not until much later that it was disclosed that we had launched our
bombers from an
aircraft carrier. That was still top secret. Also, the Japanese went
on a rampage all
through the province where we landed, killing practically every
man, woman and
child to make a point. That was perhaps the greatest tragedy of
our mission. All
of that horror was retribution against the Chinese for helping us. I
have read
estimates of at least a quarter of a million, perhaps even more people
being murdered.
They also exacted their revenge against our captured men, which
I learned of
later. Bill Farrow, Harold Spatz and Dean Hallmark were executed;
Bob Meder died
in prison, and Rob Hite, Chase Nielsen, George Barr and Jacob
DeShazer
survived to return home. The loss of those men has always stayed with
me. When people
ask about the atomic bombs and their justification, they come
to mind. In all
twenty of us who participated on the raid did not survive the war.
Q: You
did meet with General and Madame Chiang?
A: Yes,
all of us who survived were taken to the palace and decorated. It was a very
moving moment.
This was around April 30 and I had been promoted a couple of
days earlier.
Shortly afterward I was ordered home.
Q: What
do you think was the greatest benefit of the raid?
A: Well,
it did many things. First, it gave the American people hope and a sense of
pride. Second
and equally important, the raid placed the Japanese government on
notice; they
could be reached. Perhaps not in the immediate future en-masse, but
eventually, and
I think even the Japanese people realized this. The next thing it
did was to show
our allies that we were in the fight, and we were going to go at it
head on. The
psychological impact of the raid both for us and upon the enemy
could not be
underestimated. This was manifested by the fact that the enemy
pulled back
several top fighter units from the front to defend the home islands,
which would make
our job easier later.
Q: What
did you do after you returned?
A: I
went on a speaking tour, part of the war bonds drive. This lasted a while and I
flew a B-25
around the country, especially to factories and places like that. But, I
must say that
the most difficult task was writing the letters to the families of the
dead and
missing. That was always the toughest part of being a leader. The men
you lead
understand the risks, but their wives, parents and children may have a
harder time
understanding. You try and soften the blow as best you can, and hope
that it works
out. Later I worked on the planning for the placement of our forces
in Britain for
planning the air war against Nazi occupied Europe. This was the
catalyst for the
creation of the 8th Air Force on January 28, 1942. This was when
Spaatz went to
England with the advance party. The first missions against France
were in August
1942.
Q: How
did you get involved in the war after the raid?
A: Well,
General MacArthur chose General George C. Kenney to head operations in
the South
Pacific, when many people thought he would choose me. That set me
free to go to
Europe, but then the decision was made to invade North Africa as the
second front. I
was placed in charge of the new 12th Air Force, and I had a
meeting with
George Patton, and we went to London to meet with Dwight
Eisenhower, who
was in charge of Operation Torch.
Q: What
were some of the problems you faced in North Africa?
A: We
always had logistical problems, such as fuel and ammunition. One problem
was having
enough qualified personnel, especially among the ground crews.
Another gripe I
had was the effective area of operations. We had too many
aircraft too
close together, a real lesson learned from Pearl Harbor, and our
fighters were
based too far away to effectively coordinate air cover and
rendezvous,
especially given the variable weather conditions. Perhaps the greatest
concern was the
division of assets between the pacific and our theater of
operations. We
had to focus upon one or the other first; defeating Germany was
the most
critical in everyone’s mind, for a variety of reasons. Finally Churchill
and Roosevelt
agreed and we were finally given priority on fuel, ammunition and
personnel. Then
there was the Vichy French problem. We had no idea what would
happen once our
forces stormed their beaches in Morocco. Then there was the
working
relationship with the British. Now, depending upon which general you
spoke to, the
situation was different. Patton’s problems with the British was
legendary, but I
tended to get along fine with them, at least in the RAF. While in
England
preparing to go to Gibraltar in preparation for Torch things worked out
well. Later when
I was in England I had no great problems. Interesting enough, on
the way to
Gibraltar we were spotted by a flight of Ju-88’s, and that made things
interesting,
especially when they attacked us head on and shot out an engine that
was barely
operable and wounded the pilot of our B-17. We had some injuries and
we damaged a
German medium bomber. After that I always reflected upon how
simple and easy
our lot must have been when compared to what our boys flying
over Germany a
year later were be going through. Our objective was Tunis as the
British under
Montgomery were pushing hard from the east, but we were unable
to get too far
too soon. However, I was promoted to major general despite
Eisenhower’s
personal feelings towards me on November 20th. This promotion
helped me out
with my command. As I said, I had no great personal problems
with the
British, but our lack of communication and their general attitude that we
were somewhat
backward tended to create operational misunderstandings. We
needed and
obtained a higher headquarters element to coordinate all tactical air
operations. This
made life a lot easier.
Q: What
was the story with the B-26 problem?
A: The
Martin B-26 Marauder was a tricky plane to fly and many guys had been
killed in it,
therefore it developed a reputation. I took Paul Leonard with me and
we traveled to
the various B-26 bases and demonstrated the proper handling and
ease with which
the marauder could be flown. After this the trust factor rose
considerably and
the men were not reluctant to fly in it. Unfortunately, sometime
later Paul was
killed in a bombing raid. That was the saddest letter I ever wrote,
the one to his
wife.
Q: What
was your next area of operation?
A: The
Casablanca Conference decided the next stage; we would invade Sicily and
Italy as part of
the second front, which Stalin had been screaming for. Part of the
Casablanca
Conference was the Pointblank Directive, which called for the
combined
American and British bombing of Germany. This was a major decision,
but Stalin was
still unimpressed. The greatest factor of the Conference was the
ultimatum that
Germany, Italy and Japan would have to accept unconditional
surrender. Now,
this was a great political move, and I think necessary, but it may
have also
extended the war, especially for the Japanese and I am certain the senior
Germans who may
have considered negotiating once Hitler was gone changed
their minds.
Q: How
did Sicily go?
A: From
our air force viewpoint it was a good operation, although the airborne
contingent had severe difficulties. Once Patton and Monty got into gear it was
only a matter of time. The big test would be Italy. Even while the fighting
still
raged for Sicily
we were bombing Italian targets, especially ports and airfields, with special
attention being paid to railways. However, this was not a practical
application in
indiscriminate bombing, unlike British night missions. We had
specific targets
to hit, and even more importantly, specific targets not to hit, such
as the Vatican,
several monasteries and abbeys. We did not want to destroy the
old world art
and treasure. This was actually a great way to practice precision
bombing, and we
became very good at it.
Q: The
war was not going well on all European fronts, was it?
A: No.
Ira Eaker had launched his mass raids into Germany in August through
September 1943,
and had lost so many bombers due to the lack of effective long-
range fighter
escorts missions into Germany were halted. The Schweinfurt-
Regensburg Raids
were expensive, about 120 aircraft, then there were the other
missions. The 9th
Air Force lost over fifty B-24’s hitting Ploesti. Then there were
the milk runs
into France that were not so easy, especially after the Luftwaffe
waited until the
short-legged fighters turned back, then they tore into them. Eaker
pleaded for the
new version of the P-51 Mustang to be brought in. He had to wait
until January
1944 for that to happen. We also bombed German targets, such as
Augsburg from
our Mediterranean bases, and the losses were also stiff. Shortly
after the 12th
was divided into two units; the 12th and 15th Air Forces
to divide the
roles of
tactical and strategic bombing, especially in the ground support role. I
commanded the 15th.
Our first mission was to La Spezia, a port on the Italian
coast. Our raid
to Wiener-Neustadt, a fighter production facility cost us eleven
bombers, and we
took out some fifty enemy fighters and knocked out the
production
facility for about two months. That was a good day. Later on January
3, 1944 I
surrendered my command of the 15th to Nate Twining and assumed Ira
Eaker’s 8th
Air Force in England. This was in preparation for Operation Overlord.
Q: How
was your tenure as CO of the 8th?
A: It
was a great time. I had the material assets to do what I wanted, and Ira had
done
such a great job
from top to bottom I was hoping I would be at least competent.
Spaatz became
Air Force Commander, and shortly thereafter I was promoted to
lieutenant
general and I had my HQ at High Wycombe.
Q: Some
historians credit you with increasing the role of the 8th and winning
the war.
How do you feel
about that?
A: To be
honest, I think that is not true. I assumed control of the 8th when
it was just
beginning to
receive the large amount of materiel and support that would have
arrived anyway,
whether I was there or not. There were others more competent
than myself,
Eaker being a prime example, whom would have done no less and
probably more. I
was just lucky. I arrived at the time we received the P-51 long
range fighters,
and this gave our bombers greater range and protection, so
therefore the
results were more dramatic. It was the Mustang that made me look good,
and the brave men who flew them protecting our bombers. Prior to that we had
British Spitfires, Lockheed P-38 Lightnings and our Republic P-47
Thunder-bolts for escort, but they had limited range. I also decided to
visit every base and meet the men. I think that men need to see their commanders
and look into their eyes. They need to know that their commanders care about
them, and are willing to share the risk, or have been there and done it
themselves. It’s all about credibility. This increases morale, which is very
important. Another thing I did was change the mission of the fighter pilots.
They had been denied authority to pursue enemy fighters for fear of leaving the
bombers alone. Now that we had plenty of fighters, I ordered fighter leaders to
actively hunt down and destroy enemy fighters on the ground and in the air. The
kill ratios among our pilots rose dramatically, and Luftwaffe losses
soared from that point forward, and they could never recover in planes and even
more importantly, highly skilled pilots. I also ordered ground attack and
strafing missions top work the German transportation system over. If it moved,
could fly, or support the German war effort, kill it in place. This decision to
alter the tactic of the air war brought success, but also criticism. I felt the
end would justify the means. History would decide that. Spaatz thought I was
wrong and he told me so in very specific terms. Another thing I did was create a
scouting force, where a pair of fighters would head out ahead of the bomber
formations and provide accurate weather reports. This would save time and fuel,
since many groups turned back when the weather became unbearable, despite the
most favorable met reports. This proved invaluable. It also gave us decent
intelligence on air defenses on many occasions.
Q: You
also changed doctrine on required missions for crews, didn’t you?
A: Yes.
I believed that if a crew rotated after twenty-five missions that it was a waste
of experience. New crews coming in would have to adapt and this would
reduce
effectiveness. I
eventually raised the tour for bomber crews to thirty-five
missions, since
our losses were dropping and our productivity rating rose.
Q: What
would you say were the greatest problems facing the 8th when you took
over?
A: The
first think I noticed was the high rate of illness and frostbite among the
crews.
We tried to
alleviate this with giving the crews better electrically heated flight
suits and
windows for the waist gunners, since the sub-zero cold and wind created
the problem. The
other problem was the weather. All of these events were much
worse in England
than anywhere else in the war for me. Another problem was
having better
pre-mission intelligence. We had photo reconnaissance aircraft, and
before we
planned a mission we would look at the previous mission photos, as
well as photos
of intended targets. Then we would assess what had to be done,
how many
aircraft, that sort of thing. I wanted every group commander to know to
the letter what
was expected. This included the fighter units; rendezvous were
planned to the
finest detail. I wanted no bomber formation not lack fighter escort,
and I also
wanted the lead fighter groups to pound and strafe to their hearts
content to
soften the enemy on the ground. We also placed greater emphasis on
secondary and
alternative targets in case weather forced a group to abort the
primary target.
All crews were debriefed upon their return, so the boys had a long
day all the way
around. I also wanted a more effective turn around time on the
aircraft,
maximum effort from all echelons, including ground personnel. I must
say that these
guys repairing and working on the planes were the real reason for
our success, and
I feel they have not had their full due in the history books.
Q: I have
interviewed dozens of pilots from several nations, and all of them agreed
on one point-the
shuttle missions to the Soviet Union created great problems for
the Germans. You
were instrumental in that, right?
A: Yes.
This is a major issue, because our relations with the Russians was always
tenuous. I
proposed the idea that our bombers, taking off from England fly on to
western Russia,
where they would rearm and refuel. It would also give the men a
break. Plus, it
also confused the Luftwaffe, as they were wondering where the
formations were
going. With the limited range of their fighters, they could not
follow. What
they did was land after a two hour battle, refuel and rearm, and
catch the
bombers on the way back from their targets. Once the shuttle mission
was created it
changed that to a large degree in our favor. It saved planes and
aircrew, no
doubt. I even spoke to our mutual friend, General Adolf Galland about
that several
times and he agreed that the shuttle missions inhibited the German
flak and
fighters from wreaking even more damage upon us. It worked well and
was coordinated
with the 15th Air Force based in Italy. We called it Operation
Frantic, and
first mission from England was on June 21, 1944 led by Archie Old..
The 15th
had already flown the first missions on June 2 with no losses to enemy
action. Old had
over forty aircraft destroyed and about twenty-five damaged. We
also lost
fifteen P-51s, as I recall. They flew from Russia to Italy on the 26th.
Q: How
did the Soviets respond?
A: They
were a strange group. They kept demanding a second front, so we obliged,
first in Africa
then southern and Western Europe. But when it came to helping
defeat German
industry, which was fine as long as we kept within our sphere of
influence. I
read many reports from leaders stating the cold reception they
received, the
lack of active support, unless it was to refuel them quickly and get
them the hell
out of there. Then we had the problem of interned crews and
aircraft. After
the war this became a severe issue, one that Ira Eaker took up
personally. I
can tell you that LeMay was no friend of the Soviets, just like Patton.
I think Curtis
would have been just as happy planning targets in Russia once
Germany
surrendered. You interviewed him, so I guess you have your own
opinion. That is
not to say he was not a great commander and leader. He just saw
things
differently. I would have to say that of all my plans, this was the one which
just failed, in
my opinion. The Soviets did not want us there and they never hid
their
displeasure at our boys being on their soil. I would say the Cold War was
already in
effect; only the current war delayed its progression.
Q: You
were opposed to the British method of strategic bombing. Did you ever have
a chance to meet
Sir Arthur Harris?
A: Yes,
shortly after I met with King George VI. I made an appointment, we talked
for a few
minutes, and he said I was welcome to visit him whenever I wished. I
will say this;
Harris was a true warrior and he would take no nonsense, from
anyone. We got
along together very well.
Q: The
king made you a Knight of the Bath. What was that like?
A: Well,
I don’t really know why, but it was an honor. I always got a good chuckle
about that. I
could never see myself arriving at a function and being heralded as
‘Lord
Doolittle.”
Q: What
was your impression of Winston Churchill?
A: I
knew him well, and I always thought that he was one of the most informed and
knowledgeable
men I ever met. He was just what the British needed. I admired
him.
Q: I have
interview Adolf Galland several times, as well as many of the pilots who
survived the
western Front, and we spoke about ‘Big Week’ and their interpretation of how
effective it was. What is your opinion?
A: Well,
February 1944 was a busy month, but from the 19th to the 25th
I had planned
a series of
saturation missions; thousand bomber formations escorted by hundreds
of fighters to
strike as deep as possible into the heart of Nazi Germany. I felt that
if wee could
destroy the German fighters in the air by luring them up, their losses
could not be
replaced, especially among the pilots. In addition, it would further
our Pointblank
directive; the destruction of everything of material value, thus
limiting
Germany’s ability to wage effective warfare. All of this was to reduce
German assets
prior to Overlord. ‘Big Week’ proved effective and justified my
decision,
because we had minimal losses, but the Germans paid a high price in
planes and
pilots even before, and after ‘Big Week’ German aircraft production
was rapidly
reduced. Galland even admitted that to me, despite the fact that
Germany turned
out more planes in 1944 than at any other time during the war.
Planes with
pilots and fuel are worthless. Galland told me he lost 1,000 pilots
between January
and April 1944, with over 400 going down during ‘Big Week.’ I
would also state
that you could estimate our effectiveness by the thousands of
German motorized
vehicle we captured intact, without any damage. They had
simply run out
of gas.
Q: You
flew the Tokyo mission and flew in Africa and the Mediterranean Theaters.
Why were you not
allowed to fly after taking over the 8th Air Force?
A: Two
main reasons: first I had been briefed on Ultra, the code breaking system
that read the
German Enigma messages. No one knowledgeable of this was
allowed the risk
of being captured. The war effort depended upon complete
secrecy, as
history has proven to be the case. I had also been thoroughly briefed
on the plans for
Overlord, so I had a double whack against me. I still flew in
England, but my
active participation was over.
Q: Please
describe D-Day as you saw it.
A: I
took a P-38 with Pat Partridge as my wingman and we flew over the beaches and
Channel. I will
never forget that sight; thousands of ships, landing craft and
support
vessels. It was incredible. D-Day went off without a hitch for our boys.
But later I was
called on the carpet, literally, when a bombing mission had gone
wrong. Several
bombers dropped their loads short while supporting the ground
advance, and
about 100 men were killed with another 500 or so wounded, and one
of the dead was
Army General Leslie McNair. I took the responsibility, but I
always felt that
those were not the kind of missions we should have been doing in
large strategic
bombers anyway. This was tactical work and should have been
treated as such.
I felt sure after my ass chewing from General Walter ‘Beetle’
Smith that I
would be replaced, so I spoke to Tooey Spaatz. Somehow I kept my
job. The ironic
part was that Ike wanted these missions continued, and more
Americans died
as a result, but the losses were considered acceptable.
Q: What
was your opinion of men like Eisenhower, Carl Spaatz, ‘Hap’ Arnold,
Curtiss LeMay,
Ira Eaker, Patton, George Marshal, and other contemporaries?
A: Well,
first I have to say that Spaatz and Eaker became good friends of mine early
on just after WW
I. Hap Arnold was a colonel then and our CO of Rockwell Field
at that time.
Although we all had our differences of opinion later, we all respected
each other. Now,
Curtiss LeMay was a great leader and a true warrior, but I did
not get to know
him until much later. I think that Arnold was perhaps the greatest
man in our Air
Force, Billy Mitchell notwithstanding. He was a true leader and
innovator, and
he cared about what his subordinates thought. He would never
think twice when
he as a general wanted a lieutenant’s opinion on a matter. He
used to talk to
enlisted mechanics without fanfare. He was like Omar Bradley, he
had a knack for
obtaining unquestioned loyalty from his men. That is a rare gift.
Eisenhower was a
good leader, although I was always under the impression that
he never really
liked me or had a lot of faith in me. I think his professional
opinion changed
later, but his personal opinions were his own. As far as Mitchell
went, he was
truly the best long-range planner and supporter of air power. His
court-martial
was a political side-show; he ruffled too many feathers with his
hard-line
beliefs that the next war would be defined and won by air power above
all else. The
fact that he was proven correct only adds to his credibility. In 1921 I
spent some time
with him, and he was a very impressive man. This was at Langley Field, Virginia,
and I preformed my first practice bombing on ships at
sea. This was
invaluable training. But Mitchell was also a visionary with regard to his
prognostication of Japan’s future attitude towards us, and he even stated that
war between our two countries was inevitable. This among other factors
contributed to his demise. It was such a shame to lose such an officer. Hap
Arnold was a great leader and he encouraged his generals to correspond with him
directly on any and all matters. This was truly a great benefit in many ways.
Marshal was also a wonderful man who understood the needs of leaders and
subordinates. His insight into the mind of his subordinates was legendary, and I
like him very much.
Q: Given
the post-war criticism of bombing Dresden, what is your opinion today of
that mission?
A:
Dresden was just one of several cities to be bombed in order to halt German
reinforcements
from arriving at the front. The Soviets wanted Dresden bombed,
and I ordered
the strikes. The British had already been busy there. It was later that
we learned about
the high number of civilian casualties, and that was indeed
tragic. David
Irving wrote his book, which I read, and I think he got the entire
scenario wrong.
We never intended to bomb any civilians, that was a British
operation. The
entire premise of our planning was strategic in nature; hitting
military and
economic targets. Terrible things happen in wartime, of that there is
no debate. Bt to
think that any American commander would simply bomb
civilians is
unacceptable. We are not bread for that. Even Hiroshima and Nagasaki
were military
targets, and the Japanese were warned in advance. It is easy to
criticize from
the comfort of a typewriter with unfamiliar hindsight. I still think
dropping the
atomic bombs was the right thing to do. It shortened the war and
saved Allied
lives. That in itself is justification. They started, and we had the
God given right;
no, the moral duty to end that war the quickest way possible. Do
I feel bad about
the civilian casualties? Yes, but American lives were at stake, so
that is all that
needs to be said. End of story. You were a soldier, you know what I
am talking
about.
Q: As the
war wound down, how did your mission change?
A: By
April there was nothing of any great value left to bomb, and most of the
country was
occupied. We switched to operating in a tactical role. When the war
was over I gave
authorization for about 30,000 8th Air Force personnel to fly over
Germany to see
what we had done. I wanted every man to take the image home
and see for
himself what the effort was all about. I then returned home and saw
Joe, and we had
a well-deserved vacation. Later Joe I joined Patton and his wife
Beatrice for a
West Coast speaking tour, which was a real time. I finally got to
the Pacific
Theater and landed at Kadena, Okinawa on July 17, 1945, after a wild
ride that saw us
abandon our B-29 and finish the excursion in a B-17.
Q: How
did you learn of the atomic bomb?
A: I
found out first hand when Chuck Sweeny landed at my base due to a fuel
shortage after
hitting Nagasaki. That was how I knew. He came right into my office for his
debriefing.
Q: You
witnessed the signing of the Japanese surrender on the USS Missouri. What
was that like?
A: It
was a very somber and moving experience, almost surreal. As soon as the
formalities were
over a mass formation of bombers and fighters flew overhead. It
was truly a
glorious moment and I was blessed that I was able to be there.
Q: Your
sons were in the war, were they not?
A: Jim
was a combat pilot in the Pacific and John was in West Point when I was
assigned to the
North African command. Later Jim was assigned to the 9th Air
Force and we had
contact. Our first grandchild, James Doolittle III. was born in
September 1944,
the next generation.
Q: How
did you close out your remarkable service record?
A: I
retired in 1946 and went to work for Shell, while on terminal leave from active
duty. I did a
lot of traveling again, but no one was shooting at me. Then I worked
for TRW and
Aerospace Corporation. I took up hunting again late in life, and
enjoyed it
immensely. I stayed with Joe a lot when I ‘retired’ in my late 70’s or
so, until she
passed away. I miss her and Jim, Jr. She is buried in Arlington, where
I will be one
day.
Q: What
would you say are the best qualities indicative of a great leader?
A: Well,
first of all, I would not even begin to state that I was a great leader. I was
adequate and
accomplished the missions. But to answer your question, I would
say that the
following are critical and non-negotiable: integrity, morality,
understanding,
accepting responsibility for your actions, and providing
encouragement
and praise when necessary. Let the men know they can trust you,
and that you
have their best interest at heart, and they will follow you anywhere.
Live by the same
rules you enforce, and never waiver from a sound well thought
out decision
even in the face of stiff criticism. These are the traits that define a
great leader, as
well as a great man. I made my mistakes; I was not perfect.
However, I never
placed blame upon anyone else for anything that occurred under
my command. That
is the first trait of a bad leader. Plus, to be a good leader you
have to follow
orders as well, and not just the ones you like. Men will follow you
if they have
faith in you, no doubt. But they will fight and even die if they respect
you and you have
their loyalty. That is earned, not given.